CAPTURING CANNABIS DECRIMINALIZING POSSESSION IN TENNESSEE  “PURSUANT TO A VALID PRESCRIPTION” by Parrish, Brennan










DECRIMINALIZING POSSESSION IN TENNESSEE  
“PURSUANT TO A VALID PRESCRIPTION” 
Brennan E. Parrish1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Before diving into an abyss of drug history, certain key 
points and terms of art must be clarified. First, cannabis, 
marijuana, and marihuana (“cannabis” unless historical 
context uses otherwise) are the same substance, occurring in 
natural form as Cannabis Sativa L. 2  Second, cannabis is a 
Schedule VI controlled substance––not a narcotic drug.3 While 
all narcotics are controlled substances, 4  not all controlled 
substances are narcotics, and it is incorrect (under Tennessee 
law) to categorize naturally grown cannabis (in plant form) as 
 
1 Brennan E. Parrish is an associate with his father, J. Gilbert Parrish 
Jr., Attorney at Law, in Savannah, Tennessee. He would like to thank 
his wife, Ann Elizabeth Parrish, for listening to countless cannabis 
discussions and Professors M. Akram Faizer, Melanie M. Reid, Ann 
W. Long, Brennan Wingerter, and William Gill for their excellent 
guidance and assistance while studying medical cannabis 
regulations at Lincoln Memorial University School of Law. 
2 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(16)(A) (2019) (“‘Marijuana’ 
means all parts of the plant cannabis”); with The Tennessee Drug 
Control Act of 1971, §2(n) (defining “marihuana” as “all parts of the 
plant CANNABIS SATIVA L”); and 21 U.S.C.A. §802 (Westlaw 2019) 
(“‘marihuana’ means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L.”). 
3  TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(4) (2019) (providing, “’Controlled 
substance’ means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor in 
Schedules I through VII of §§ 39-17-403 –– 39-17-416”). 
4 Id. 
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a narcotic drug.5 Third, an “ultimate user” is one who may 
lawfully possess a controlled substance (e.g., oxycodone, 
amphetamine salts, or cannabis) by virtue of a valid 
prescription.6 Forth, one-half ounce of cannabis could provide 
anywhere from fifty-six days of medical use to upwards of 
ninety days of use, depending on the patient and consumption 
rate.7 Fifth, physicians are authorized to prescribe cannabis in 
Tennessee.8 
II.  DISCUSSION OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 
 Ostensibly, due to the fact that no Tennessean has yet 
to be arrested for medical marijuana possession while holding 
a valid prescription authorizing medicinal use, no direct case 
law exists.9 Although the current statutory framework fails to 
clarify inner and outer limits of key components,10 a handful 
of interpretations on the “‘valid prescription’ exception” 
 
5 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(17) (2019) (failing to include 
marijuana or cannabis in definition of “narcotic drug”). See also 1980 
Tenn. AG LEXIS 562 (concluding that “[i]t is apparent…marijuana is 
not a narcotic drug.”) (emphasis added). 
6 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(26) (2019) (“‘Ultimate user’ means 
a person who lawfully possesses a controlled substance for the 
person's own use or for the use of a member of the person's 
household…”). 
7 If a patient took five “hits” of marijuana each day, one-half (1/2) of 
an ounce would provide the patient relief for at least fifty-six days. See 
JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE 
NEEDS TO KNOW 22 (2012) (noting that one “’hit’ is about 1/20th of a 
gram of marijuana”); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-418(b) (2019) 
(listing one-half ounce of marijuana as 14.175 grams). Thus, a patient 
would use around .25 grams of marijuana for one day of relief.  
8 2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 157 (“Read together in pari materia, any 
controlled substance listed in the enumerated statutes is included 
within the exception of TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-418(a).”). 
9 See, e.g., State v. Long, No. W2016-02471-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 
3203124, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2018), perm. app. denied 
(Sept. 17, 2018) (affirming marijuana possession charges against 
appellant who had California doctor’s written “recommendation” 
for “marijuana as a pain medication”).  
10 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402 (2019) (failing to define 
“valid prescription”). See also 2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 151 at *11 (citing 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-10-404 as earlier code defining “prescription 
drug”).  
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exist. 11  Interestingly, Tennessee’s historical code versions 
reveal over a century of law allowing controlled substance 
possession by prescription for medical purposes.12  To fully 
understand the current code, multiple sections in parie materia 
must be noted. 13  Unescapably, after reviewing Tennessee’s 
controlled substance laws (historical and current), medical 
cannabis possession is authorized––regardless of how a court 
interprets the statute.  
A.  SECTION 418(A) IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND THE STATUTE’S 
PLAIN MEANING AUTHORIZES MEDICAL CANNABIS 
POSSESSION WITH A VALID PRESCRIPTION. 
 “It is an offense for a person to knowingly possess [] a 
controlled substance…unless the substance was obtained 
directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription.”14 This section 
is clear on its face––it authorizes lawful possession if the 
possessor has a valid prescription. Ultimate users may obtain 
a valid prescription for medical cannabis because Tennessee 
practitioners are authorized to write prescriptions for “any” 
controlled substance.15 The only restraint for one seeking to 
utilize medical cannabis in Tennessee is the “legitimate 
medical purpose” and proof that the “‘valid prescription’ 
exception” applies. Statutory interpretation of the current code 
version authorizes medical cannabis possession by its plain 





11  See Part II, infra. See also 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 40 (denying 
“[a]uthority of Municipality to Decriminalize Marijuana Possession” 
but failing to note if medical possession is allowed via prescription).  
12 See generally Hyde v. State, 174 S.W. 1127 (Tenn. 1914). See, Public 
Act, 63rd Tenn. Gen. Ass. Ch. No. 91, SB 383 (Passed March 24, 1923) 
(providing “[a]n act to regulate the sale, bartering, possession and 
control of opium and coca leaves…”) [emphasis added]. 
13 See State v. Kilpatrick, 327 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010) 
(discussing “valid prescription exception” and noting additional 
statutory sections such as TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-11-410). 
14 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-418(a) (2019) (emphasis added). 
15 2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 157 at *10. 
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1.  THE UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE’S INTERPRETATION 
DECRIMINALIZES MEDICAL POSSESSION.  
 When analyzing what types of controlled substance 
were within § 418(a), the Attorney General noted, “Tennessee 
courts have promulgated two cardinal rules of statutory 
construction.” 16  The primary rule is to “follow the plain 
meaning of the statute where the language is clear and 
unambiguous on its face.” 17  Moreover, “where a statute is 
plain and explicit in its meaning, and its enactment within the 
legislative competency, the duty of the courts is simple and 
obvious, namely, to say [what the law is] and obey it.” 18 
Significantly, “it is not for the courts to question the wisdom of 
a legislative enactment.” 19  
 Importantly, the current code contains another 
“exception” provision in addition to § 418(a). It provides: “It is 
an exception to this part if the person lawfully possessed the 
controlled substance as otherwise authorized by this part and 
title 53, chapter 11, parts 3 and 4.”20 Chapter 11 (“Narcotic 
Drugs and Drug Control”) contains two prescription 
possession exceptions in part III. Section 302 (“Handlers of 
controlled substances”) embodies the historical exception 
allowing possession via a prescription 21  and § 308 
(“Prescription Requirements”) specifically addresses 
restrictions on more stringently regulated controlled 
substances.22  
 Relative to medical marijuana, § 308(d) provides: “A 
controlled substance included in Schedule V shall not be 
distributed or dispensed other than for a medical purpose.”23 
This is noteworthy because the prior subsections only refer to 
schedule I, II, III and IV. 24  Thus, the perplexing question 
immerges, why does the statute not address schedule VI (or 
 
16 Id. at *4; see also 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 33. 
17 Jackson v. General Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Tenn. 2001).  
18 Miller v. Childress, 21 Tenn. 319, 321-22 (1841). 
19 2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 157 at *4 (citing Hamblen Cty. Educ. Ass'n v. 
Hamblen Cty. Bd. of Educ., 892 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1994) (citing Worrall v. Kroger Co., 545 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. 1977))). 
20 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-427 (2019).  
21 See discussion infra Part II (i).  
22 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-11-308 (2019).  
23 TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-11-308(d) (2019). 
24 TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-11-308 (2019).  
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VII) in any form? Due to the omission of any reference to 
Schedule VI,25 it is difficult to determine if the Code provision 
would implicitly include or exclude cannabis; however, read 
in parie materia, the distinction is moot as a physician can 
prescribe “any” controlled substance.26 
2.  THE STANDARD DEFINITION OF “PRESCRIPTION” 
CLEARLY DECRIMINALIZES POSSESSION BASED ON ITS 
PLAIN MEANING.  
 Oddly, the current Code does not define 
“prescription.” 27  If a statutory term “is not defined in the 
statute, nor [] defined by Tennessee Courts” then to 
“interpret[] the meaning of a word or phrase in a statute, the 
court may use dictionary definitions.”28 Relative to § 418(a)’s 
medical context, the word prescription (in noun form as in the 
statute) is “a written direction for a therapeutic or corrective 
agent….”29 This definition beckons to the everyday reader that 
the prescription establishes lawful ownership over a 
controlled substance, as long as it is valid. Thus, under the 
statute’s plain meaning, a “prescription” is a written direction 
for a therapeutic agent, establishing a right to possess a drug 
for an amount of time authorized by statute. That drug is 







25 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-427 (2019).  
26 2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 157 at *10.  
27 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-11-
301 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-236 (2019). 
28 McGarity v. Jerrolds, 429 S.W.3d 562, 578 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) 
(citing State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 859 (Tenn. 2010)).  
29 PRESCRIPTION, Merriam-Webster (last visited March 4, 2019) 
(emphasis added). 
30  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-236 (2019) (failing to include 
“expiration date” as a required entry for a valid prescription). Thus, 
once a prescription meets the requirements, possession appears 
authorized indefinitely.  
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3.  PHYSICIANS MAY LEGALLY PRESCRIBE CANNABIS 
BECAUSE WHEN READ IN PARI MATERIA, ANY 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IS WITHIN § 418(A)’S 
EXCEPTION.  
 In reviewing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418(a), the 
Attorney General explained:  
 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-402(4) defines a 
controlled substance as a “drug, substance, or 
immediate precursor in Schedules I through VI 
of §§ 39-17-403 - 39-17-415 inclusive.” Read 
together in pari materia, any controlled substance 
listed in the enumerated statutes is included within 
the exception of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-
418(a).31 
 
 Clearly, cannabis is within the scope of the physician’s 
authority to prescribe.  
B.  ALTHOUGH § 418(A) IS NOT AMBIGUOUS, IF IT WERE, 
CANNONS OF CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZE MEDICAL 
CANNABIS POSSESSION WITH A VALID PRESCRIPTION.  
 If the text is considered ambiguous, interpretation 
favors medical cannabis in Tennessee. Mindful of Albert 
Einstein’s saying, “If you want to know the future, look to the 
past,” Tennessee’s historical drug laws aid in understanding § 
418(a). Although alcohol is not a controlled substance, at one 
point in time it hardly differed from cannabis. During 
prohibition, possession of alcohol was federally banned; yet, 
Tennessee physicians were authorized to prescribe alcohol to 
patients.32 If a patient had a prescription, they could obtain the 
substance from a “druggist” who held the substance for 
medical purposes.33 Ironically, at one point in time, alcohol 
 
31 2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 157 at *10 (emphasis added). 
32  See Tennessee Code, 11 § 11219(2) (1932) (“Reception and 
possession by druggists, hospitals, and manufactures for certain 
specified purposes”). 
33 See Motlow v. State, 145 S.W. 177, 181 (Tenn. 1911) (denying relief 
for proprietor of Jack Daniels distillery claiming whiskey was 
manufactured for medical resale); see also Slaven v. State, 257 S.W. 90, 
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could not be sold in Tennessee and was imported across state 
lines to avoid problems from local producers selling illegally.34 
Undeniably, Tennessee’s medical exception during federal 
bans on alcohol favors medical cannabis possession via a 
prescription––irrespective of the federal bans on cannabis.35 
Provided the ultimate user obtains a valid prescription, the 
historical analysis of Tennessee’s drug laws showcase a State 
policy favoring lawful possession of medical cannabis. 
1.  TENNESSEE’S HISTORICAL CODE SHOWS A CLEAR 
POLICY OF AUTHORIZING POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH A VALID PRESCRIPTION.  
 In 1857, drug regulations concerned only opium and 
coca leaves (of which morphine and cocaine may be derived, 
respectively). 36  Pre-1900’s regulations focused on labeling 
requirements, with little focus on medical possession of a 
controlled substance. 37  Importantly, the possession by 
prescription exception appears in the 1923 Code.38 It excluded 
from prosecution, “any person having in his possession or 
under his control any of the aforesaid drugs which has or have 
been prescribed or dispended by a physician, dentist, or 
veterinary surgeon registered in the State of Tennessee….”39 
 
91 (Tenn. 1923) (citing 1917 Act containing medical exceptions for 
alcohol use by “bona fide patients” during prohibition). 
34 Slaven, 257 S.W. at 91.  
35  See also Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical 
Marijuana and the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1453 (2009) (discussing legal status of state 
medical marijuana regulations). 
36 See Tenn. Code Pt. IV, Tit. I, Ch. 7, Art. II, § 4831 (1857) (noting 
laudanum and morphine derived from opium as drugs subject to 
labeling regulation). 
37 Notably, opium and coco leaves were also mentioned in the 1923 
code version in which the drugs could be possessed pursuant to a 
valid prescription; See Tenn. Code Pt., I Tit., 14 Ch., 21, § 6619(d) 
(1932).  
38 See Public Act, 63rd Tenn. Gen. Assembly Chapter No. 91, Senate 
Bill No. 383 (Passed March 24, 1923) (providing, “An act to regulate 
the sale, bartering, possession and control of opium and coca 
leaves…”).  
39 Compare Tenn. Code 18 § 6585 (1932) (listing drugs such as “alpha 
or beta eucaine, chloroform, cannabis indica, and chloral hydrate”); 
with Tenn. Code 91 § 6619 (1932) (noting opium and coco leaves as 
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Thus, reviewing Tennessee’s historical drug regulations, two 
state interests are clear: (1) prohibit unauthorized use of 
dangerous drugs and (2) provide authorized possession of 
drugs for medical use.  
 Near the end of prohibition, Tennessee modified the 
law by incorporating new language relative to drug 
possession. With wording similar to the current law, the 1932 
Code exempted from prosecution those in “possession” of 
drugs prescribed by a state-registered physician.40  Similarly, 
the 1955 version also contained the possession by prescription 
exception.41  Although cannabis was mentioned in the 1932 
Code, it was not formally defined until 1955. 42   The 1955 
definition (mirroring the current Code) defines cannabis as: 
“all parts of the plant cannabis sativa L….”43 The 1955 Code is 
clear––cannabis is not a narcotic drug under Tennessee Law.44  
2.  WHEN § 418’S ORIGINAL LANGUAGE WAS CODIFIED, IT 
CLEARLY AUTHORIZED MEDICAL CANNABIS POSSESSION 
BASED ON THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND SCHEDULE 
PLACEMENT.45  
 “Pursuant to, a valid prescription” first appeared in 
the Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971.46 This critical link 
answers many questions concerning marijuana, cannabis, or 
 
sole drugs requiring a prescription for lawful possession); and Tenn. 
Code 91 § 2(d) (1923) (regulating possession of opium and coca 
leaves).  
40 See Tennessee Code, 21 § 6619(d) (1932). Accord Tennessee Code, 21 
§ 6619(d) (1934) (Superseded by, Uniform Narcotic Drug Law, Tenn. 
Code 21A § 6632.1 (1937, Ch. 255, § 24).  
41 See Tenn. Code 52 § 1312 (1955).  
42 See Uniform Narcotic Drug Law, Tenn. Code 13 § 52-1302(14) (Acts 
1937, Ch. 255 § 24).  
43 Tenn. Code 52 § 1302(14) (1955). 
44 Id. Accord 1980 Tenn. AG LEXIS 562 (“It is apparent…marijuana is 
not a narcotic drug.”). 
45 This heading references “§ 418” for consistency and clarity. The 
actual codified provision with the original language is located in the 
Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 15(c)(3). 
46 See Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971, Ch. 163, HB 522.  
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“marihuana,” and its application to our current Code.47 For 
example, it explains why cannabis was included in Schedule 
VI.48 The Act provides:  
 
There is hereby established a Schedule VI for 
the classification of substances which the 
Commissioner of Mental Health upon the 
agreement of the Commissioner of Public 
Health, upon considering the factors set forth in 
Section 3(a) of this Act, decides should not be 
included in Schedules I through V. The 
controlled substances included in Schedule VI 
are: (1) Marihuana.49   
 
 Notably, marihuana is the sole drug listed in Schedule 
VI in the 1971 Code.50 Similarly, the current Code includes 
only marijuana and cannabis derivatives in Schedule VI.51 The 
factors in Section 3(a) determine a controlled substance’s 
appropriate placement and include:  
 
(1) the actual or relative potential for abuse; (2) 
the scientific evidence of its pharmacological 
effect, if known; (3) the state of current scientific 
knowledge regarding the substance; (4) the 
history and current pattern of abuse; (5) the 
scope, duration, and significance of abuse; (6) 
the risk to the public health; (7) the potential of 
the substance to produce psychic or 
physiological dependence liability; and (8) 
whether the substance is an immediate 
precursor of a substance already controlled 
under this section.52 
 
 
47The Act created: “A comprehensive system of drug and drug abuse 
control for Tennessee…relative to contraband drugs; and [provides] 
certain penalties and for rehabilitation and treatment.”  
48 Contra, Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (Westlaw 
2019) (noting Schedule I placement). 
49 Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 15 (emphasis added).  
50 Id.  
51  TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-415 (2019) (listing marijuana and its 
derivatives in Schedule VI). 
52 Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 3(a).  
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 While Section 15 places “marihuana” in Schedule VI, it 
fails to provide any further explanation as to why or what the 
commission’s actual findings were on the substance. Based on 
the legislative history’s text, the commissions must have 
determined marihuana had: (1) “low potential for abuse” 
relative to Schedule V substances; (2) “currently accepted 
medical use in treatment in the United States”; and (3) 
“limited physical dependence or psychological dependence 
relative” to Schedule V drugs––because if the commissions felt 
otherwise, marihuana would have been placed in Schedule V–
–not Schedule VI.53 Thus, even if marihuana is not expressly 
stated as having Schedule V qualities, it implicitly must have 
these requirements by virtue of being in a lesser schedule 
placement. Schedule VI placement shows the legislature’s 
informed decision evidencing little concern relative to 
marijuana use and potential public harm.54 
 In addition to 1971’s schedule placement, the 
Tennessee Drug Control Act appears to be the first authority 
to establish lesser penalties for marijuana possession. 55 
Specifically, “casual exchanges” of “marihuana, not in excess 
of one-half (1/2) ounce, for no remuneration…” were reduced 
from felony to misdemeanor.56 Here, the 1971 Code embodies 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418(b)’s express language regarding 
quantity.57 Although the 1971 Code is not a verbatim recitation 
of the current Code, the substantive content and application to 
possession is hardly distinguishable, allowing offenders to be 
charged with a lesser misdemeanor possession charge. 
 
53 Compare Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 §5 (listing Schedule I 
drugs with “high potential for abuse” and “no accepted medical 
use”); with Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 §13 (listing Schedule 
V drugs as having “low potential for abuse…current accepted 
medical use…[and] limited physical dependence” relative to 
precursor substances); and Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 15 
(failing to delineate any findings relative to marijuana and Section 
3(a) factors).    
54 Cf., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-405 (2019) (noting drugs in Schedule 
I have high potential for abuse).  
55 Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 25(a)(3). 
56 Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 25(b)(1). See also 2012 Tenn. 
AG LEXIS 33 (defining “casual exchange” as “the spontaneous 
passing of a small amount of an illegal drug, regardless whether 
money is received for the exchange of the illegal drug.”). 
57 Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 §25(b)(1). 
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Notably, the possession via prescription language is verbatim 
to the current Code.58 The only differences in the provisions 
appear to be omitting “intentionally” from the mens rea of the 
former statute and the addition of “causally exchange” to the 
actus reus of the latter.59 Invariably, the 1971 Code yields the 
most practical legislative insight on the statute. 
 As a matter of thoroughness, it should be noted that 
the current Criminal Code has been modified since 1971; 
however, no provisions have been modified relative to: 
naturally grown marijuana;60 the valid prescription exception; 
or casual exchanges.61 Moreover, audio recordings from the 
legislative floor debates on the Tennessee Drug Control Act of 
1971 do not shed any light on marijuana’s placement or the 
valid prescription exception.62 Notably, Tennessee’s Criminal 
Code undertook a major overhaul in 1988. 63  Although 
additional enactments to the Code have occurred since the 
primary provisions were enacted in 1971, “pursuant to a valid 
prescription” remains unchanged. Thus, mindful of the 
historical exceptions allowing possession by a valid 
prescription, medical use of marijuana appears fully 
authorized by the legislature, provided that the user obtains a 
valid prescription.  
 
58  Compare Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 §25(b) (noting 
“unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a 
valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the 
course of his professional practice”); with TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-
418(a) (2019) (same). 
59 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-418(a) (2019).  
60 Modern additions to the code regarding new forms of cannabis 
(e.g., “tetrahydrocannabinols” and “synthetic equivalents” derived 
from cannabis are omitted from discussion due to there non-organic 
origins. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-455 (2019) (proscribing 
“manufacture [of] marijuana concentrate by a process which use[s] 
inherently hazardous substance” as a Class E felony). 
61 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417(b) (1982); see also TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 39-17-418(b) (1988). 
62 To ensure thorough research, audio recordings discussing HB 522 
were purchased from the Tennessee State Library and Archives. 
Although references to the simple possession statutes were made in 
the discussion, there was little insight relative to medical use of 
controlled substances obtained from the recording.  
63 See Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1989; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-
401 (1988). 
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3.  ARGUING § 418(A)’S COMMA IS “OBVIOUSLY 
MISPLACED” FAILS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
LEGISLATIVE INACTION. 
 Justice Brock’s concurring opinion in Sanderson takes 
an interesting viewpoint on Tennessee’s statutory provision.64 
Although contrary to the historical policy of the Criminal 
Code (authorizing possession via a prescription) Justice 
Brock’s concurrence asserts:  
 
The comma between the words “to” and “a” is 
obviously misplaced and should be placed 
between the words “of” and “a,” the meaning 
being that lawful possession of a controlled 
substance must be obtained either directly from 
a physician or from a pharmacist pursuant to a 
valid prescription or order of a physician.65 
 
 It is highly unlikely that the comma placement in 
Tennessee’s prescription exception was “obviously 
misplaced.” Without question, reading the statute as Justice 
Brock asserts might make the provision easier to apply in the 
legal analysis, but it is not up to the judicial department to 
question the acts of the legislature.66  Simply put, Sanderson 
was decided forty-two years ago. If Justice Brock’s assertions 
were correct, why would the legislature have yet to correct the 
error? To ask is to answer, and considering the language 
remains unchanged, it is highly unlikely the comma was 
“obvious misplaced” when: (1) first written in 1971; (2) re-
codified in 1982 and 1988; and (3) printed in the current 
Code.67   
 Nonetheless, the doctrine of legislative inaction applies 
to the “obviously misplaced” comma in the 1971 Code. In 
 
64 See State v. Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tenn. 1977).  
65 Id. at 239, n.1 (Brock, J., concurring).  
66 Reynolds v. Gray Med. Inv'rs, LLC., No. E2017-02403-COA-R9-CV, 
2018 WL 6504086, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018) (citing 
Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 704 (Tenn. 2013)). 
67 Compare Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971 § 25(b) (codifying 
language in Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 237); with TENN. CODE ANN. § 
39-6-417(b) (1982) (incorporating language and punctuation 
verbatim); and TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6-417(b) (1988) (containing 
same); and TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6-418(a) (2018) (same). 
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most circumstances, “inaction [of the legislative department] is 
generally irrelevant to the interpretation of statutes.”68 There is 
however, a “limited exception” to this principle “when the 
legislature’s inaction follows judicial interpretation of a 
statute.”69 Specifically, the doctrine:  
 
Presumes that, had the legislature disagreed 
with a prior judicial construction of a statute, it 
would have amended the statute accordingly. It 
is not a rule of law; rather, it is a judicial 
principle that permits—but does not compel—a 
presumption of legislative acquiescence in a 
prior judicial interpretation of the statute.70 
 
 “Given this long-standing judicial application of the 
statute,” one “can presume that the Legislature agrees” with 
the statutory application as it occurred in Sanderson, “and 
there is no authority to suggest otherwise.”71 The assertion 
that the comma is misplaced is incorrect in light of the 
doctrine of legislative inaction. Finally, based on the well-
known principle that it is not for the courts to “alter or amend 
statutes or substitute [their] policy judgment for that of the 
Legislature,” the current version of the statute appears to be 
written consistent with the legislative department’s desires.72 
C.  ALTHOUGH § 418(A) AUTHORIZES MEDICAL CANNABIS 
POSSESSION, THE PATIENT MUST PROVE THE “‘VALID 
PRESCRIPTION’ EXCEPTION” APPLIES TO AVOID CRIMINAL 
PENALTIES.  
 
68 Hardy v. Tournament Players Club at Southwind, 513 S.W.3d 427, 
443 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 
172 S.W.3d 512, 519 (Tenn. 2005)). 
69 Id. at 444. 
70 Id. See, e.g., Goodman v. HBD Indus., Inc., 208 S.W.3d 373, 379 
(Tenn. 2006) (noting that “the Legislature has also expressed its tacit 
acceptance of the decision, in that it has chosen not to overrule it by 
statute.”).  
71 Dedmon v. Steelman, 535 S.W.3d 431, 462 n.29 (Tenn. 2017) (citing 
Hardy, 513 S.W.3d at 444 (Tenn. 2017)).  
72 Reynolds, 2018 WL 6504086, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018) 
(citing Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 704 (Tenn. 2013)). 
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 Even though Tennessee’s current Code decriminalizes 
an ultimate user’s medical cannabis possession pursuant to a 
valid prescription, the patient (as the defendant) has the 
burden to show the “‘valid prescription’ exception” applies.73 
The patient must show that there is a legitimate medical 
purpose 74  and the prescription must be: (1) “issued by a 
licensed practitioner”; (2) “acting in good faith”; (3) “in accord 
with accepted medical standards”; and (4) “the person 
obtaining the prescription” must act “in good faith…free from 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”75  
1.  “INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY” DOES NOT APPLY 
TO § 418(A)’S POSSESSION EXCEPTION.  
 As noted in Sanderson, the legislature did not intend to 
place a “protective cloak around anyone who procures a 
prescription…by fraud, misrepresentation or deceit.” 76  Not 
surprisingly, one claiming to be exempt from prosecution 
must prove innocence to avoid guilt (and abuse of the 
exception). 77  The Duke court dismissed the defendant’s 
possession charges under the valid prescription exception 
after the defendant showed “by a preponderance of the 
evidence” that the substance at issue “had been prescribed by 
a physician.” 78  Although the statutes fail to list what the 
burden of proof is to rebut the unlawful possession 
presumption, it appears to be the civil “more likely than not” 
standard according to Duke. 79  Thus, any medical cannabis 
patient must realize: (1) he or she can be arrested for possession 
and (2) innocence must be proven.   
 
73 See TENN. CODE ANN. §53-11-410(a) (2018) (“The burden of proof of 
any exemption or exception is upon the person claiming it.”). See also 
State v. Kilpatrick, 327 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Tenn. Crim. App. January 21, 
2010). 
74 State v. Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tenn. 1977).  
75 Id. at 239. Accord State v. Kilpatrick, 327 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. 2010) (citing Sanderson in discussion of the “‘valid 
prescription’ exception”).  
76 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 238.  
77 Kilpatrick, 327 S.W.3d at 68.  
78 Duke v. State, 366 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1963).  
79 See id. But see TENN. CODE ANN. §53-11-410 (2018) (failing to list 
burden of persuasion requirement). 
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2.  THERE MUST BE A LEGITIMATE MEDICAL PURPOSE FOR 
THE EXCEPTION TO APPLY. 
 The threshold requirement to establish a prescription’s 
validity is that the prescription be issued for a “legitimate 
medical purpose.”80 Factors aiding the legitimacy analysis are: 
factual circumstances of the actual patient and medical 
justification for the substance based on the claimed illness.81 
Although these two factors are not expressly mentioned in 
case law, they are clearly the most significant factors in the 
legitimate medical purpose analysis. 
 The leading case on the “‘valid prescription’ 
exception” is State v. Sanderson.82 The defendant in Sanderson 
was the sister of the female patient.83 Acting “on behalf of her 
sister” the defendant procured a prescription in her sister’s 
name for a Schedule IV diet pill “sight unseen” asserting that, 
“her sister [] had a weight problem.”84 Notably, diet pills were 
often abused as an “upper” yet the physician wrote the 
prescription for the defendant’s sister without confirming if 
any actual need for the substance existed. 85  While the 
defendant was a regular patient of the physician, the actual 
patient (defendant’s sister) had never visited (or even met) the 
physician.86   
 Analyzing the “legitimate medical purpose” for the 
sister’s prescription, the Court looked at the factual 
circumstances of the patient. The court found it most 
suspicious that a female patient, weighing 115lbs and being (5) 
five foot (8) eight inches tall, could have a legitimate need for 
prescription diet pills. 87  Consulting numerous anatomical 
sources, the Court concluded: “this ‘fat lady’ weighs a 
minimum of 40 pounds less than the average woman of her 
 
80 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 237 (analyzing the “valid prescription 
exception” in §52-1432(b) of The Tennessee Drug Control Act of 
1971). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 236.  
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 237. 
85 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 237-38. 
86 Id. at 236-37. 
87 Id. at 237-38. 
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age and height….”88 Unsurprisingly, there was “no legitimate 
use for diet pills” by the “skinny” patient and the prescription 
rendered was not “sound medical practice.”89  Additionally, 
the Court noted the pills were left “at a beer joint with the 
label removed” and clearly “never designed for any legitimate 
purpose.”90  
 The claimed illness and medical justification played a 
strong role in Sanderson. While diet pills differ from cannabis–
–it is clear that a court will inquire into the medical 
justifications for any controlled substance prescription. 91 
Damming defendant’s medical justification in Sanderson was 
the physician’s testimony, “I don’t know anything about these 
drugs.”92 Unsurprisingly, the Court used the Physicians’ Desk 
Reference because it was an “authoritative and standard 
treatise” on medical substances. 93  Since the drug was for 
weight loss, the Court stated that there was no illness 
justifying the patient’s prescription, and accordingly, no 
medical justification for the patient to use the substance.94 
Thus, under Sanderson, medical cannabis patients need: (1) an 
illness justifying cannabis and (2) proof that “sound medical 
practice” supports issuing a prescription for the illness.95  
3.  THE PATIENT MUST SHOW FOUR ELEMENTS TO INVOKE 
THE VALID PRESCRIPTION EXCEPTION. 
 Assuming there is a legitimate medical purpose for the 
prescription, a patient must show the “‘valid prescription’ 
 
88 Id. at 238 (citing sources such as the World Almanac Newspaper 
Enterprise Association, Factbook on Man: From Birth to Death, and 
Book of Health––A Medical Encyclopedia for Everyone) (emphasis 
added).  
89 Id. at 237-38. 
90 Id. at 238. 
91 See id. at 237 (noting “good faith” requirement of physician to 
prescribe medicine “to relieve” ailments of the patient such as pain 
and suffering”). 
92 Id. 
93 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 237. 
94 See id. at 238 (noting that the defendant failed to call the sister as a 
witness which would have allowed the jury to “observ[e] first-hand 
whether [the patient] was in need” of the substance prescribed).  
95 Id.  
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exception” applies. 96  As the current statutory language is 
verbatim to that in Sanderson, nothing more is required.97 The 
Sanderson court clearly held:  
 
The “valid prescription” exception [applies] 
when the prescription is issued by a licensed 
practitioner, acting in good faith and in accord with 
accepted medical standards and when the person 
obtaining the prescription is also acting in good faith 
and is free from fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 
A “valid prescription” presupposes ethical and 
prudent conduct on the part of the practitioner 
and honest motivation on the part of the 
patient.98  
 
 The first element requires issuance by a licensed 
practitioner 99  and it is met when the patient procures the 
prescription from a licensed Tennessee practitioner. 100  The 
second element of good faith (discussed at length in Sanderson) 
is specific to the physician’s conduct––not the patient. 101  In 
Sanderson, the physician did not act “in good faith.” 102 
Specifically, the physician’s “gross negligence” in prescribing 
a weight loss pill without even seeing the patient sufficiently 
 
96 Id. at 239.  
97 See Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971, supra note 67.  
98 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 239 (emphasis added). 
99 Cf, State v. Long, No. W2016-02471-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3203124 
(Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2018) (discussing marijuana possession 
charges against appellant with California doctor’s written 
recommendation of medical marijuana for pain).  
100  Under the current code, “Practitioner” means: “A physician, 
dentist, optometrist, veterinarian, scientific investigator or other 
person licensed, registered or otherwise permitted to distribute, 
dispense, conduct research with respect to or to administer a 
controlled substance in the course of professional practice or 
research in this state; or A pharmacy, hospital or other institution 
licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, 
conduct research with respect to or to administer a controlled 
substance in the course of professional practice or research in this 
state.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(23) (2019) (emphasis added). 
101 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 238.  
102 Id.  
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showed a lack of good faith.103 Overall, the determination of a 
physician’s good faith is made on a case-by-case analysis.104 
 The third Sanderson element is perhaps the largest 
hurdle for medical cannabis patients. It requires showing 
medical cannabis is “in accord with accepted medical 
standards.”105 Perhaps due to the federal cannabis ban, not all 
known medical benefits are readily available. Plus, even if 
another state’s legislation shows medical condition benefits 
from medical cannabis, it would not be binding on a 
Tennessee court.106 Undeniably, a patient may assert accepted 
medical standards support cannabis by official treatise (e.g., 
physician’s desk reference).107 Critically, as thirty-four states 
now allow medical cannabis, it is likely in accordance with 
accepted medical standards.108  
 Finally, the fourth Sanderson element requires “the 
person obtaining the prescription” show “good faith” in 
obtaining the prescription without “fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.”109 Again, the patient must actually need 
medical cannabis. Additionally, the patient must use the drug 
in a manner evidencing good faith. Thus, the patient loading 
up cannabis in a “carburation mask”110 for a weekend social 
with friends (who do not have a cannabis prescription) would 
 
103 Id. at 237.  
104 See Duke v. State, 366 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1963) (failing to find or 
discuss any lack of good faith by physician prescribing dolophine 
solution to defendant who “told th[e] doctor that he was a “drug 
addict”).  
105 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 239.  
106  See Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment of 2016 § 2(13) 
(listing “qualifying medical conditions” such as: Cancer, glaucoma, 
Tourette's syndrome, Crohn's disease, ulcerative colitis, post-
traumatic stress disorder, cachexia or wasting syndrome; peripheral 
neuropathy; seizures (including characteristic of epilepsy); or severe 
and persistent muscle spasms).  
107 See Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 237 (citing physician’s desk 
reference); see also Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, American Psychiatric Association, p. 511, (5th Edition) 
(2013) (noting cannabis may be used to treat nausea and vomiting 
caused by chemotherapy, anorexia, and weight loss in individuals 
with AIDS).  
108 State Medical Marijuana Laws, National Conference of State 
Legislatures, (March 3rd, 2019).  
109 Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 239. Accord Kilpatrick, 327 S.W.3d at 68. 
110 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(12)(C)(iv) (2018). 
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not be acting in good faith.111 Interestingly, the “paraphernalia 
exception” would however allow such use by an ultimate user 
with a valid prescription.112 
 Out of an abundance of caution, any patient seeking to 
invoke the valid prescription exception must ensure the 
prescription meets statutory requirements for validity. 
Although not mentioned in Sanderson, it is especially 
important for a medical cannabis prescription that the 
quantity not exceed one-half ounce (the amount specifically 
mentioned in § 418(b)). The Code authorizes prescriptions in 
handwritten form, but it will require the physician’s writing to 
be legible, signed, and dated.113 Additionally, the prescription 
must also contain: (1) prescribing physician’s name; (2) drug 
prescribed; (3) drug strength; (4) drug quantity; and (5) proper 
drug instructions (e.g., “this substance should not be used in a 
manner that violates the law, such as operating a motor 
vehicle”). 114  If a patient shows these requirements, then 
criminal sanctions for medical cannabis possession should not 
be imposed. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 Regardless of how § 418 is interpreted, the plain 
language contained in it authorizes possession of medical 
cannabis if the ultimate user possesses a valid prescription. 
Tennessee practitioners (including physicians) are authorized 
to prescribe cannabis. The prescription’s validity hinges on 
compliance with case law and statutory provisions. Failure to 
meet these requirements will result in criminal penalties as the 
burden is on the patient to prove the valid prescription 
exception applies. Where a defendant/patient proves (by a 
preponderance of the evidence) cannabis in his/her 
possession is held pursuant to a valid prescription, he or she is 
exempt from criminal sanctions under the current statutory 
 
111 See Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d at 238.  
112 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-425 (2018) (saying paraphernalia is 
unlawful “except when used or possessed…by a person 
authorized…to…possess a controlled substance”) [emphasis added]. If 
cannabis in a pipe, water-pipe, bong, etc. is possessed pursuant to a 
valid prescription, then the use of the corresponding paraphernalia 
appears exempt from criminal sanctions. 
113 TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-236 (2019). 
114 Id.  
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framework. Although one may be arrested and tried, the 
appropriate ruling should be acquittal. Thus, it appears that 
medical cannabis possession is effectively decriminalized 
when possession is pursuant to a valid prescription.  
